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I  Introductory remarks and scope of the input statement 
 
The present input statement is prepared by the International Observatory on the Taxation of the 
Digital Economy.  The Observatory is a joint initiative put in place by the Tax Policy Center of the 
University of Lausanne (www.unil.ch/taxpolicy) and the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (www.ibfd.org)   as   part   of   a   research   project   “Taxation   and   Digital   Innovation”  
(https://goo.gl/5MWCKZ). The Observatory is a neutral academic platform aiming at contributing 
to fiscal policy challenges raised by the digital economy. In addition to its founding members, the 
Observatory also includes other research partners, in particular the Institute for Tax Law of KU 
Leuven (https://www.law.kuleuven.be/fisc/). The contributors who prepared this input are listed in 
the cover page of this document in alphabetical order. 
The input statement concentrates on the following issues raised by the OECD request for input on 
work  regarding  the  tax  challenges  of  the  digitalized  economy  (“the  request  for  input”): 
 
 The implementation of the current BEPS package (section II hereafter). 
 
 Options to address the broader direct tax policy challenges (section III hereafter). Our 
comments thus focus on (i) the concept of “significant  presence  test” (SEP), (ii) a withholding 
tax on certain types of digital transactions and (iii) a digital equalization levy. We in particular 
look at the compatibility of these measures with international obligations, namely tax treaties, 
EU law and WTO law (section III hereafter). 
 
Needless to say, however, that our comments ought to be considered as a preliminary and high 
level analysis and would of course need to be refined/revisited once the details of a particular 
policy option are known.  
 
II Implementation of the current BEPS package   
 
1. Although the final report on Action 1 report1  has not led to a conclusive output shared by all 
States on a possible adaptation of the international tax law framework to the new business 
models, it is, on the other hand, quite clear that some of the items of the BEPS package were 
                                                          
1   OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (cited Action 1 Final Report 
hereafter). 
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designed to also tackle the tax policy challenges raised by the digital economy. Conceptually, 
the most promising item in this respect is BEPS Action 72 which aims at reducing the 
Permanent  Establishment  (“PE”) threshold by amending paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of art. 5 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. Pursuant to these amendments, the maintenance of a very large 
local warehouse in which a significant number of employees work for purposes of storing and 
delivering goods sold online to customers by an online seller of physical products (whose 
business model relies on the proximity to customers and the need for quick delivery to clients) 
would constitute a permanent establishment for that seller under the new standard3. Further, 
BEPS Action 7 also modifies the agency PE definition to address circumstances in which 
artificial arrangements relating to the sales of goods or services of one company in a 
multinational group effectively result in the conclusion of contracts, such that the sales should 
be treated as if they had been made by that company. The Action 7 Final Report notes for 
example that an online provider of advertising services habitually plays the principal role in the 
conclusion of contracts with prospective large clients for those products or services, and these 
contracts are routinely concluded without material modifications by the parent company, this 
activity would result in a permanent establishment for the parent company4. From this 
perspective, BEPS Action 7 introduces a change of policy as compared to the existing agency 
PE concept under tax treaties, especially in jurisdictions favoring a formal interpretation of this 
concept. 
2. This being said, BEPS Action 7 has at least two main shortcomings. First of all, BEPS Action 7 
does not represent a minimum standard and several signing jurisdictions to the Multilateral 
Instrument (MLI) have reserved the right not to include the revised PE definition in their treaty 
practice. Moreover, under the MLI the modifications to the PE definition would come into 
effect only when both parties to the Covered Tax Agreement (CTA) agree to adopt the 
provision. Secondly, it is well known that a number of jurisdictions have not adopted the 
changes recommended by BEPS Action 7 because of concerns regarding how profit attribution 
should take place under this revised PE definition. This latter debate is of course still ongoing. 
                                                          
  2  OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (cited Action 7 Final 
Report hereafter). 
3   See Action 1 Final Report, p. 12 and Action 7 Final Report, Para. 13 (commentary to new Art. 5(4) in Para.  
22). 
4              See OECD, Action 7 Final Report, Para. 32.6. 
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In its input to the 22 June 2017 Discussion Draft on Additional Guidance on the Attribution of 
Profits to Permanent Establishments, the Tax Policy Center of the University Lausanne has 
discussed the challenges raised in this area5. For instance, with respect to the warehouse PE, the 
taxable profit in market jurisdiction will be restricted to the limited functions performed by the 
PE i.e. warehousing activities6.  Similarly, in the case of the agency PE, once the intermediary is 
compensated  on  an  arm’s  length  basis,  the  input  statement  argues  that  no  further  profit  should  
be attributed to the PE7. For these reasons, it is therefore fair to say that the implementation of 
BEPS Action 7 by jurisdictions is rather heterogeneous8. Accordingly, some of us advocate 
in favor a stronger coordination between the tax treaty aspects (lowering or rethinking the 
permanent establishment definition) and transfer pricing issues (attribution of profits to 
permanent establishments), on the other hand9.  
3. We feel that the tax policy challenges raised by the digital economy underscore the need for an 
increased coordination between tax treaty and transfer pricing aspects. Therefore, some of 
us feel that if future work is to be carried in this area with a view to revisit, once again, the 
permanent establishment threshold it would be desirable to (i) first resolve the controversy 
surrounding the attribution of profits under BEPS Action 7 and (ii) simultaneously address 
                                                          
5       University of Lausanne, Tax Policy Center, DANON R./CHAND V., Comments on the 22 June 2017 Discussion 
Draft on Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (cited Comments on the 
Discussion Draft hereafter), Example 4, Paras. 45-49. 
6          Ibidem 
7  University of Lausanne, Tax Policy Center, DANON R./CHAND V., Comments on the Discussion Draft, Example 
2, Paras. 28-35. The analysis under the foregoing situations is premised on the assumption that the tax treaty at 
stake follows the Authorized OECD Approach (AOA), see OECD (2010), 2010 Report on the Attribution of 
profits to permanent establishments, Paris (cited Attribution Report hereafter), Part I: General Considerations, 
Para. 10.) However, if the tax treaty at stake provides for a non-AOA methodology (a formulary approach), then 
the profits attributable to the PE could be significantly higher (for instance, the market jurisdiction may allocate 
a percentage of the sales to the PE). Therefore, attribution of profits to the PE in a market jurisdiction would 
depend on the exact wording of the treaty. Consequently, uniform attribution rules do not exist and each State 
may adopt its own approach. 
8  See thereupon DANON R. / SALOMÉ H., The BEPS Multilateral Instrument – General overview and focus on 
treaty abuse, in IFF Forum für Steuerrecht, 3, 2017, p. 197 
9  See DANON R., The Permanent Establishment Concept in the Post BEPS world – Selected thoughts on future 
challenges, forthcoming; CHAND, V./SPINOSA, L., Shortcomings of BEPS Action 7 with Respect to Taxing 
Digital Business Models, Section 6, forthcoming. 
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whether a consensus and a feasible solution could be found under transfer pricing rules for the 
digital economy10. Otherwise, the entire exercise would in our view yield little practical results.    
4. Finally, the lack of agreed coordinated framework under BEPS Action 1 has, meanwhile, led 
several jurisdictions to adopt unilateral measures. Experience shows that these measures may 
have distortive effects and lead to new international double taxations situations.  
III Options to address the broader direct tax policy challenges  
 
III.1 Significant Economic Presence test (SEP) 
III.1.1 In general   
 
5. Turning to options aiming at addressing the broader direct tax policy challenges of the digital 
economy, we begin with the tax nexus concept of “significant   economic   presence” (SEP). 
Specifically, an input is requested on the following questions: what transactions should be 
included within its scope? (ii)  how should the digital presence be measured and determined? 
(iii)  how could meaningful income be attributed to the significant economic presence and how 
would such an approach interact with existing transfer pricing rules and profit attribution rules 
applicable to the traditional permanent establishment? and (iv) how could such a measure be 
efficiently and effectively implemented in practice?  
6. The objective of any business is to sell goods or provide services or do both. Goods can either 
be physical products or digital products. Physical products could either be sold through 
brick/mortar models or through online mediums. On the other hand, digital products are mostly 
sold online. Likewise, services can either be provided physically through brick and mortar 
models or through online mediums. The question arises as to whether the SEP concept should 
apply   to   “all   enterprises”   that   commercialize   their   activities   through  brick   and  mortar  models  
and/or online mediums or should the concept capture only “digital   enterprises”   that 
commercialize their activities mainly through online mediums? In order to avoid the issue of 
“ring-fencing” the  digital  economy  (i.e.  applicability  of  the  rules  only  to  “digital  enterprises”),  
the SEP concept should, from a subjective standpoint, be  applicable  to  “all  enterprises” 11; at the 
                                                          
10         Ibidem. 
11  On this issue, see also COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS, Report 
E/C.18/2017/CRP.22 on Tax challenges in the digitalized economy: Selected issues for possible consideration, 
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same time, as far as the objective scope is concerned, the test should not be overly broad. Of 
course, the SEP test would apply to non-resident enterprises that have a purposeful and 
sustained interaction with the economy of the market jurisdiction.  
 
III.1.2 Compatibility issues 
III.1.2.a Relation with tax treaties and transfer pricing  
 
7. The Action 1 report proposes several factors12  (such as revenue based, digital based and user 
based factors) to determine whether or not a SEP exists in the market jurisdiction. The adoption 
of the SEP threshold would of course require an amendment to the tax treaty definition of 
permanent establishment13, so to allow this concept to operate as nexus for taxing rights on 
profits also for the new business models connected with the digital economy. Yet, as discussed 
above, this option would yield little practical result if the possibility of making changes to the 
attribution guidelines14  and the transfer pricing guidelines15 is not explored simultaneously. 
Indeed, if the existing AOA is applied, profit attribution will depend on the significant people 
functions performed at the level of the PE. If significant people functions are not performed in 
the market jurisdiction then the income attributable to the PE will be negligible16. Therefore, 
significant changes will need to be made to the current profit allocation framework, which will 
require thorough studies of the possible reform options.  
8. Some of the contributors of this input argue that it would be desirable to ascertain whether the 
application of a specific method for allocation of taxing rights (such as for instance the profit-
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Fifteenth session (17-20 October 2017) (cited Report on Tax Challenges in the digitalized economy hereafter), 
Para. 8 – 12. 
12         With reference to the potential factors that could further be considered to that effect, see HONGLER, P./PISTONE, 
P., Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy (January 1, 2015). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586196. 
13  Art. 5 of the OECD Model (see OECD (2014), Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital (cited OECD Model hereafter)).  
14  Art. 7 of the OECD Model; OECD (2010), 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, Paris. 
15  OECD (2017), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinationals Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
16         CHAND, V./SPINOSA, L., Shortcomings of BEPS Action 7, Section 6. 
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split method) could reach satisfactory results for the new business models connected with the 
digital economy and the current framework be reformed accordingly. In this regard, it should be 
determined whether the concept of assets for the purpose of attribution of income to the 
permanent establishment could also include intangibles that are connected with the involvement 
of users in the market jurisdiction17.  
9. Some of the other contributors feel by contrast that another possible alternative may be to 
implement the SEP test through a shared taxing rights mechanism (for instance, see Art. 10 and 
11 of the OECD Model or Article 12 of the UN Model).  The Tax Policy Center of the 
University of Lausanne is currently exploring whether and how this option or other similar 
options that move in the same direction could concretely be implemented and how the policy 
and legal issues such an option may raise could be addressed. 
III.1.2.b Relation with EU Law 
 
10. The EU Law implications of a SEP-based approach would refer to the two planes of EU primary 
and secondary law. In particular, EU primary law issues would refer to the interaction with the 
EU fundamental freedoms and with the prohibition of State Aid enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Secondary law would mainly refer in this context 
to the interaction of the proposed measures with the existing framework of Directives in the area 
of direct taxation18.  
11. From an EU primary law perspective, it is settled case law that under the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Member  States’  retain the power to define, by treaty 
or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers on taxation19. Therefore, the introduction 
of the SEP threshold for purposes of allocating taxing powers should in principle not be 
incompatible with the EU non-discrimination concept. It may also be envisaged that the SEP 
be coupled with a non-final withholding tax acting as a supplementary collection mechanism 
and enforcement tool, as outlined in section III.2.1 of this note. Under such a scenario, it should 
                                                          
17      See in this regard HONGLER, P./PISTONE, P., Blueprints for a New PE Nexus and BRAUNER, Y./PISTONE, P., 
Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models: Two Proposals for the European Union, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 12, 2017, in particular Section 3. 
18  With reference to the compatibility of the SEP with EU Law further considerations are carried out in BRAUNER, 
Y./PISTONE,  P., Adapting Current International Taxation, in particular Section 3.  
19  See CJEU, 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint-Gobain, Para. 56-58. 
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be explored whether any concern could be raised from a primary EU Law viewpoint with regard 
to the different treatment (essentially in terms of cash-flow disadvantage and supplementary 
administrative   burden)   of   different   “categories”   of   non-residents, assuming that non-resident 
taxpayers with a   “traditional”   PE  would   not   be   subject   in the PE State to a withholding tax 
while non-resident  taxpayers    with  a  “digital”  SEP would be subject to a withholding tax, albeit 
non-final20.    
12. State aid law (art. 107 et seq. TFUE) should however also be borne in mind. State aid rules 
could indeed become potentially applicable if a Member State unilaterally introduces rules on 
profit allocation that result in a different (higher) tax burden for certain undertakings, as 
compared to other undertakings that are legally and factually comparable, adopting as a 
reference framework the tax regime ordinarily applicable to undertakings21. From the 
perspective of State Aid rules, therefore, it would be important to ensure that the new rules do 
not ring-fence a specific sector of activity, such as for instance the digital economy. 
Accordingly, any tax bias between the regime applicable to traditional and new business models 
can potentially generate a ring-fencing effect and become a selective tax advantage that distorts 
or threatens to distort competition within the internal market. 
13. On the other hand, the SEP concept does not seem problematic from the perspective of 
secondary EU law22.  
 
 
 
                                                          
20  This circumstance also raises a new form of market equality problem between two different ways of exercising 
the secondary right of establishment that trigger the liability to tax in the host state at different standards, i.e. 
between   the   “traditional”   PE   and   the   SEP. See in this regard, CJEU, 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint-
Gobain, Para. 47 – 53, where the Court concludes that two forms of exercise of the secondary right of 
establishment are equivalent whenever the host State exercises its taxing jurisdiction on them. 
21       See in this regard, CJEU, 21 December 2016, Case C-20/15 P, World Duty Free and CJEU, 15 November 2011, 
Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, Gibraltar with regard to the assessment of the presence of legal and 
factual selective advantages.  
22  For the sake of coherence, however, it may be worthwhile to consider whether PE definitions in secondary EU 
law (e.g. in article 2(b) of the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive) would benefit from an interpretation and application 
that is consistent with those proposed solutions. 
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III.2 Withholding Tax on Certain Digital Transactions and Equalization levy 
 
III.2.1 Scope of the analysis  
 
14. The BEPS Action 1 Report mentions that a withholding tax23 could, in theory, be imposed 
alternatively24: (i) as a standalone gross-basis final withholding tax on certain payments made 
to non-resident providers of goods and services ordered online; or (ii) as a primary collection 
mechanism and enforcement tool to support the application of the nexus option based on SEP. 
15. The first configuration of the concerned withholding tax could be applied to transactions for 
goods or services ordered online (i.e. digital sales transactions) or to all sales operations 
concluded remotely with non-residents. Under the second configuration, the withholding tax 
would be non-final and would be used as a tool to support net-basis taxation. In this scenario, a 
broad scope of application covering all remote supplies could be foreseen, the tax so withheld 
could be claimed against any outstanding tax liability resulting from the detection of SEP or, 
shall no SEP be detected, be claimed back by the affected taxpayer.  
16. Based   on   the  wording   of   the   “Request   for inputs”, it would be our understanding, based on 
reference  to  potential  instances  of  “international  double  taxation”,  that,  for  the  purposes  of  the  
consultation, the focus would be placed on the first configuration of a withholding tax approach. 
At the same time, it would seem to us that it would be hard to distinguish between such a 
“standalone   gross-basis final withholding tax on certain payments made to non-resident 
providers   of   goods   and   services   ordered   online”   and   an   “equalization   levy”   as   currently  
understood in the current international tax policy debate. For this reason, we have brought these 
two options under a single heading, provided that they would raise analogous issues in terms of 
compatibility with EU and international trade law obligations25. It should also be noted that this 
                                                          
23         A further implementation model of withholding-based approach that would not be limited only to specified  
           “digital   transactions”  may  be   found   in  BRAUNER, Y./BÁEZ MORENO, A., Withholding Taxes in the Service of 
BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (February 2, 2015). WU International 
Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2015 - 14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591830. 
24  See Action 1, Para. 7.6.3. 
25  On the other hand, the second configuration of the withholding tax would have to be placed with the broader 
framework of the SEP and would only function as a collection mechanism and enforcement tool. For this reason, 
for the broader implications of such an option, a reference could be made to the considerations carried out in 
relation to the SEP in Section III.1. 
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approach seems justified by the circumstance that questions raised with regard to the 
“withholding  tax”  approach  and  the  “equalization  levy” approach  are  the  same  in  the  “Request  
for  inputs”,  namely:   
(i) What transactions should be included within [the] scope [of the tax]? 
(ii) How could the negative impacts of gross basis taxation be mitigated? 
(iii) How could the threat of double taxation be mitigated? 
(iv) How could such a measure be efficiently and effectively implemented in practice? 
17. As acknowledged also by the BEPS Action 1 Report, an equalization levy could be structured in 
a variety of ways depending on its ultimate policy objective26. The policy rationale of an 
equalization levy as purported by the Action 1 Report would be intended to serve as a way to 
tax non-resident enterprises where it is perceived that the latter would have a SEP in a 
jurisdiction.   
18. In this regard, even though no detailed draft has been circulated, the Communication recently 
released by the European Commission briefly refers to an equalization levy as a “[a]  tax  on  all  
untaxed or insufficiently taxed income generated from all internet-based business activities, 
including business-to-business and business-to-consumer, creditable against the corporate 
income  tax  or  as  a  separate  tax.”27 At the same time, no public draft has been circulated to date. 
19. In the light of the above, we shall consider an equalization levy on the digital economy as a tax 
charged on the turnover of enterprises operating in this sector, i.e. the turnover derived from 
their global business. Moreover, we shall assume that this levy pursues the goal of allowing the 
country of value creation to exercise its taxing sovereignty over business connected with the 
digital economy and to equalize the tax burden applicable to business in the traditional scenario 
of the physical economy. For such reason, we shall also assume that the equalization levy 
applies neither to traditional business activities, nor to the ones that operate under the sole 
sovereignty of that state (so-called purely domestic business activities). Finally, we shall assume 
in such scenario that the state of residence of all business will continue levying taxes on all 
                                                          
26 See Action 1, Para. 7.6.4. 
27  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL. A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM(2017) 
547 final, Brussels 21.9.2017, at 10. 
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business income, thus both the ones connected with the digital and physical economy, giving 
relief for foreign taxes levied on income under the applicable domestic and treaty rules. 
 
 III.2.2 Compatibility issues  
 III.2.2.a Relation with tax treaties   
 
20. Although the characterization of an equalization levy is debatable, it seems however outside the 
scope of tax treaties (art. 2 OECD Model Tax Convention)28. Therefore, the introduction of an 
equalization levy by market jurisdictions on a unilateral basis may entail a risk of 
international double taxation as the State of residence would not be obliged to provide relief 
under the applicable tax treaty and/or, as the case may be, under its domestic double taxation 
relief rules29. 
 III.2.2.b Relation with EU Law  
21. The EU Law implications of an equalization levy would refer to the two planes of EU primary 
and secondary law. In particular, EU primary law issues would refer to the interaction with the 
EU fundamental freedoms and with the prohibition of State Aid enshrined in the TFEU. 
Secondary law would mainly refer in this context to the interaction of the proposed measures 
with the existing framework of Directives in the area of taxation and, in particular, due to the 
circumstance that the equalization levy may be characterized as tax on turnover, with secondary 
EU law in the area of VAT.  
                                                          
28  In the Indian experience, the equalisation levy has been expressly carved out of the income tax. It may however 
always be argued that the Indian Equalisation Levy may more correctly be characterised as a withholding tax 
rather  than  a  “pure”  equalisation  levy  in  the  sense  purported  by  the  BEPS  Action  1  Report. 
29  It may be noted that the US allows the interpretation of its tax treaties in a way that foreign tax relief is given for 
taxes levied “in lieu of income tax”, including in such context especially withholding taxes. Yet, it is doubtful 
whether such an interpretation could allow to reach satisfactory results in respect of relief for taxes levied on 
turnover, as it would be the case for an equalisation levy, provided that the latter ones are substantially different 
from the ones levied on income. Therefore, this situation could lead to polarise taxation of income in the country 
of residence of the enterprise and taxation of turnover in that of the market, generating a potential negative tax 
bias that could severely undermine cross-border economic relations connected with the new business models and 
the digital economy. 
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22. Under the case law of the CJEU,30 any tax advantage resulting for providers of services from the 
low taxation to which they are subject in the Member State in which they are established cannot 
be used by another Member State to justify less favorable treatment in tax matters given to 
recipients of services established in the latter State. Since the object and purpose of equalization 
levies would be to allow for an exercise of taxing powers in the State of the recipient of digital 
services, thus systematically compensating taxes charged by the State of the supplier in 
conformity with a different nexus, such levies would clearly constitute a tax obstacle on the free 
circulation of services within the European Union. Accordingly, insofar as digital services are 
effectively supplied from an EU Member State to another EU Member State, any compensatory 
effect produced by the equalization levy charged by the latter State in respect of a more 
favorable tax treatment applicable in the former State, may be incompatible with Article 56 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  The likely non-creditability of such a tax 
under tax treaties may further exacerbate the different treatment across the borders as compared 
to the one applicable to traditional business models, which can further dissuade persons from 
supply digital services in another Member State.  
23. In summary, the very concept of equalization levies, as described in the previous section, would 
be at odds with the principles and foundational legal values of the EU internal market, to the 
extent that the levying of tax on business activities connected with the digital economy may 
potentially harm level-playing field in the European Union. This may occur insofar as such 
levies apply to the revenue derived from cross-border digital situations only, and a give rise to 
different tax treatment from the one that applies to income generated from traditional business 
activities. In fact, this situation may therefore generate a different treatment across the borders 
as compared to the one applicable to traditional business models, which can further dissuade 
persons from supplying their services digitally. 
24. In concrete terms, the equalization levy would be implemented in the form of a final 
withholding tax on certain transactions. Such an approach would be compatible with the EU 
fundamental freedoms only insofar as it would apply identically to comparable residents and 
non-residents or, more generally, to comparable cross-border situations and purely domestic 
situations. This yardstick would preclude different rates, but also – given the case law of the 
CJEU – taxation on a gross basis in cross-border situations and on a net basis in comparable 
domestic situations.  
                                                          
30  See in particular, CJEU, 26 October 1999, case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehr, especially Para. 44 – 45.  
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25. From an EU primary law viewpoint, a domestic measure that distinguishes between residents 
and non-residents (assuming that the withholding tax be applied only to non-residents) appears 
to be problematic from the perspective of the fundamental freedoms.  
26. Any domestic measure that imposes a higher tax on either of these categories would only be 
compatible with EU law if justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest. A 
likely justification on which Member State may tend to rely would be the need to prevent tax 
avoidance and   evasion.   In   this   regard,   the   CJEU’s   traditional   response   to   this   type   of  
justification has been that domestic measures in that area ought to specifically target wholly 
artificial arrangements31. Measures that go beyond this standard, and also cover arrangements 
that   are   not   ‘wholly   artificial’,   such   as   the   one   hereby   under   scrutiny,   would   be   difficult   to  
maintain  in  the  light  of  the  CJEU’s  consistent  case  law.   
27. It may also be observed in more specific terms that, provided that, the BEPS Action 1 Report 
traces   the   idea  of  an  “equalization   levy”   to   the   taxation  of   the   insurance   industry32, it may be 
useful to refer to the CJEU decision in the Safir case33. That case concerned a Swedish rule 
requiring residents that took a life insurance policy with a non-resident insurer to pay an 
insurance premium tax in Sweden (leading to burdensome procedural requirements for policy-
takers choosing a non-resident   insurer).   The   Swedish   measure   was   intended   “to   ensure  
competitive  neutrality”  between  domestic  and  foreign  policies. The CJEU held that, due to its 
dissuasive effect on cross-border insurance services, the measure was contrary to the freedom to 
provide services. Given the express reference in the Final Report of BEPS Action 1 to such 
levies on insurance premiums as an inspiration for the suggested equalization levy (as well as its 
objective  of  “ensuring  equal  treatment  of  foreign  and  domestic  suppliers”),  the  Safir  case  serves  
as a useful illustration of the possible restraints imposed by European law in this context. 
28. Moreover, EU State Aid law could apply if an EU Member State unilaterally introduces a 
withholding on (certain) digital transactions in such a way that the conditions of application 
                                                          
31  CJEU, 12 September 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, Para. 55. 
32  Namely, in the area of insurance, some countries have adopted equalisation levies in the form of excise taxes 
based on the amount of gross premiums paid to offshore suppliers. Such taxes are intended to address a disparity 
in tax treatment between domestic corporations engaged in insurance activities and wholly taxable on the related 
profits, and foreign corporations that are able to sell insurance without being subject to income tax on those 
profits, neither in the state from where the premiums are collected nor in state of residence. See Action 1, Para. 
7.6.4. 
33  See CJEU, 28 April 1998, case C-118/98, Safir. 
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thereof (de iure or de facto) result in a different (higher) burden for certain undertakings, as 
compared to other undertakings that are legally and factually comparable, adopting as a 
reference framework the tax regime ordinarily applicable to undertakings34. Asymmetric tax 
burdens may arise, for instance, where a specific sector of activities is treated more favorably 
than other sectors. The design of a withholding tax should thus carefully consider the limits 
imposed by EU State Aid law and avoid creating asymmetric burdens. 
29. Finally, EU law precludes EU Member States from introducing  ‘turnover  taxes’  in  addition  to  
VAT35. The CJEU has held this to be the case for turnover taxes that display the essential 
characteristics of VAT even if they are not identical to it in every way36; at the same time such a 
test would foresee that all the four characteristics of VAT would have to be met to that effect37. 
The qualifying characteristics would in particular be the following:  (i) the tax applies generally 
to transactions relating to goods or services; (ii) it is proportional to the price charged by the 
taxable person in return for the goods and services which he has supplied, (iii) it is charged at 
each stage of the production and distribution process, irrespective of the number of transactions 
which have previously taken place, (iv) the amounts paid during the preceding stages of the 
process are deducted from the tax payable by a taxable person, with the result that the tax 
applies, at any given stage, only to the value added at that stage and the final burden of the tax 
rests ultimately on the consumer.  Since  the  taxable  basis  of  an  “equalisation  levy”  would most 
likely be the sales price charged to the customer, these characteristics should be borne in mind 
in order to ensure that the withholding tax cannot be considered as a turnover tax in the sense of 
EU law. 
                                                          
34       See in this regard, CJEU, 21 December 2016, Case C-20/15 P, World Duty Free and CJEU, 15 November 2011, 
Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, Gibraltar with regard to the assessment of the presence of legal and 
factual selective advantages.  
35  See Art. 401 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006. 
36  CJEU, 31 March 1992, Case C-200/90, Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen Trading, in particular Para. 11 – 14 and 
CJEU, 29 April 2004, Case C-308/01, GIL Insurance and Others, Para. 32. 
37  See in this regard CJEU, 8 June 199, Case C-338/97, Pelzl and Others and CJEU, 3 October 2006, Case C-
475/03, Banca Popolare di Cremona, Para. 28 – 38  where  the  “test”  and  the  underlying  reasoning  is  applied  to  a  
tax such as IRAP. At the same time, a more literal interpretation of the prohibition to introduce turnover taxes 
has recently been set forth by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion of 5 September 2013 delivered in relation 
to the case C-385/12 on the special Hungarian retail tax. For the time being, however, the Court of Justice would 
appear to have upheld its narrower test. 
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30. An additional issue of compatibility with EU law could arise insofar as the equalization levies 
were introduced by means of enhanced cooperation, i.e. by a number of EU Member States 
representing at least one third of the total EU Member States38. In particular, Article 326 TFEU 
indicates that such cooperation shall neither undermine the internal market, nor constitute a 
barrier to trade between Member States or distort competition between them. Article 327 adds 
that it should respect the sovereignty of States not participating to enhanced cooperation. 
Because of its compensatory effects, the equalisation levies may in our view undermine the 
sovereignty of EU Member States that have opted not to participate to it. 
III.2.2.c  Relation with International Trade Law 
31. The most obvious part of the WTO umbrella of agreements that is at odds with the equalization 
levy  is  the  GATS,  since  it  is  likely  that  the  majority  of  the  equalization  levy’s  base  is  likely  to  
be viewed as receipts from the provision of services. The classification of the tax base is 
important for the WTO analysis since the different agreements protect different sorts of trades 
differently, the GATS applying to the provision of services only.  
32. A precise and detailed analysis of compatibility of an equalization levy with the GATS would 
require a detailed legal rule as well as a particular national context, since different countries 
submit in the GATS specific and differing obligations, and such obligations were based on a 
classification method that had been devised prior to the ascent of the digital economy, so the 
analysis of the specific countries obligations under the GATS is not straightforward when it 
comes to the digital economy39. Yet, basic treaty interpretation rules and common practice must 
lead one to conclude that arguing that the later evolution of the digital economy cannot be used 
to fully exempt it from GATS scrutiny.  
33. In fact, at a broader level, it may be argued that there is a general agreement that the digital 
economy should not be ring-fenced   and   hence   it   should   be   treated   as   “the   economy”   for   the  
purposes of its taxation. In more specific terms, it should be observed that many countries have 
                                                          
38     For further considerations on the potential implications of an introduction of this measure by means of enhanced 
co-operation, see BRAUNER Y./ PISTONE, P., Adapting Current International Taxation, in particular Section 2.  
39  The case of India is a peculiar one, in fact, the scope of application of the equalization levy would cover digital 
advertisement. This circumstance would provide India with some significant leeway given that, in its Schedule 
of Commitment to National Treatment under GATS, India has not included advertisement services. The 
Schedule of Commitments for each economy may be retrieved at the following link: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm  
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made GATS commitments in sectors that clearly include digitalization, such as advertising, 
telecommunication and software. For the purposes of our compatibility analysis we assume 
therefore that the equalization levy will impact trade in services subject to GATS obligations in 
many if not most cases40. 
34. The GATS include two primary   rules:   national   treatment   (“NT”)   and   most-favored-nation 
(“MFN”).   The   application   of   the   former   concerns   discrimination   among   foreigners,   and  
therefore it applies in cases of different treatment of residents of different countries. We are 
unable to predict whether such practice is likely to occur in this context and hence we shall 
focus on the NT norm. GATS Art. XVII prohibits a less favorable treatment of foreign service 
providers compared to domestic service providers (in the covered industries).  
35. There is little doubt that the equalization levy provides an additional burden on foreign service 
providers, especially if we assume that the levy is unlikely to be creditable by the state of 
residence of the service provider. 
36. GATS includes an exception in Art.  XIV(d)  for  “difference  in   treatment  …  aimed  at  ensuring  
the  equitable  or  effective   imposition  or  collection  of  direct   taxes,”  direct   taxes  defined  as  “all  
taxes on total income, on total capital or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on 
gains from the alienation of property, taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts, and taxes on the 
total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital 
appreciation.”41 Even if the equalization levy were argued to operate as an  “equalizer”  it  would  
not pass this exception on point since it is levied on the turnover of corporations.42 
37. In any event,  GATS  Art.  XIV’s   chapeau43 provides that carve-outs are not absolute, and may 
still be challenged under GATS if they constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
disguised restrictions on trade in services. There is little law on the interpretation of this 
                                                          
40  The Indian equalisation levy is a notable exception because it would apply to (online) advertisement and India 
has not committed to National Treatment under GATS with regard to advertisement services. Shall the scope of 
application of the levy be broadened – as it was originally proposed – significant international trade law issues 
may arise also for India.  
41         See Art. XXVIII (o) GATS. 
42  This provision includes a footnote with illustration of measures that may be acceptable, yet since the levy cannot 
qualify for the exception, one cannot analyse it in light of this footnote. 
43 That reads: “Subject  to  the  requirement  that  such  measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction  on  trade  in  services  ...” 
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chapeau, yet it obviously may be used as a basis for litigation against the equalization levy in 
front of the WTO. 
38. It should be noted that the application of the GATS may be just part of the WTO law 
compatibility of the equalization levy. The GATT also includes NT and MFN provisions. 
Assuming irrelevance of the MFN norm (see above assumption), the NT rule in the GATT, Art. 
III:2 prohibits discrimination against imported goods by the means of internal (nontariff) taxes. 
Discrimination is measured by comparison between the treatment of the imported goods and 
“like”  domestic  products.  The  likeness  test  may  be  complex  in  this  case, yet if the equalization 
levy is imposed on the turnover it may very well be viewed as applying separately to each and 
every product imported, especially if it is a simple flat tax as its seems to be under the currently 
floated proposal. Moreover, there is no reason to argue that products in this case do not include 
digitized products. Many digitized products compete against very similar digitized domestic 
products, and therefore one must anticipate exposure of the equalization levy to the GATT NT 
with respect to these products.44  
39. In conclusion, an equalisation levy substantially displaying the features of a turnover tax is 
likely to be incompatible with WTO obligations of many countries, primarily pursuant to 
the GATS, but also pursuant to the GATT. The exact exposure depends on the exact 
articulation of the levy and the countries applying it, yet, in any event the incompatibility is 
likely to very meaningful. A non-universal levy, applying differently to different countries, may 
require even further caution due to the potential application of the MFN clauses in addition to 
the NT provisions discussed above. 
III.2.3 Synthesis 
40. An   “equalization   levy”   implemented   in   the   way   it   is   generally   purported   in   the   current  
international tax policy debate on the basis of the Indian experience would appear to be hard to 
distinguish from a turnover tax. This characterization would evidently not raise issues of 
compatibility with income tax treaties as such tax would fall outside of their scope. At the same 
                                                          
44  As earlier mentioned, Art. III.2 is traditionally understood as applying only to indirect taxes, and not to income 
(or other direct) taxes because these cannot be qualified as taxes on products. Nevertheless, there is no clear 
language necessitating this interpretation. In our opinion even direct taxes may qualified under Art. III, para. 2 as 
“other   internal   charges   of   any   kind”.  The   equalization   levy   is   even  more   vulnerable   than   income   taxes  when  
applied to the turnover as explained above. 
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time, this would imply that said levy would typically not be creditable in the State of residence 
of the affected taxpayer thus giving rise to instances of international double taxation. 
41. On the other hand, such a levy would be susceptible to raise varied and not easy to resolve 
compatibility issues with European law and international trade law obligation. The latter 
potential issues have most likely not been raised with regard to the Indian equalization levy 
simply because such levy would fundamentally apply to online advertising and, for the time 
being, India has not committed to National Treatment for this type of services under the GATS. 
42. In a way, the equalization   levy   may   actually   be   considered   as   “a   solution   in   search   of   a  
problem”,  provided  that  the  trigger  behind  the  whole digital taxation policy debate was offered 
by the perception that MNEs were not paying their “fair share” of (income) taxes. By 
introducing a solution outside of the scope of the income tax we would be moving in 
unchartered territory and potentially encourage   a   proliferation   of   “alternative   levies”   that   are  
likely to undermine not only the international tax regime but the very reliance on the income tax 
as a pillar of the international tax regime.  
 
*** 
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